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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The case of McGlone v. Cheek concerned the potential 
impairment of a citizen’s constitutional rights to free speech and due 
process as a result of a public university’s inconsistent and vague 
written policies.1  Plaintiff John McGlone (McGlone) brought action 
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 against several officials employed 
by the University of Tennessee (the University) in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee concerning the 
University’s written policies on its sponsorship requirement.2  The 
Sixth Circuit ultimately held that the University’s sponsorship 
requirement policy was vague and unclear to a person of ordinary 
intelligence, invited arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and 
threatened to chill free speech.3   
 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Plaintiff McGlone was a devout Christian who traveled to 
public universities and their campuses to help spread the teachings of 
Christianity to college students.4  McGlone was not compensated for 
his faith-related speeches, nor was he represented by a religious 
affiliation; he acted on his own volition.5   
 On August 25, 2010, McGlone alerted the University—located 
in Knoxville, Tennessee—of his intention to speak on campus the 
following day, as he had similarly done for his past visits.6  In 
                                                 
 
1 McGlone v. Cheek (McGlone I), 534 F. App’x 293, 294 (6th Cir. 2013).  
2 McGlone v. Cheek (McGlone II), No. 3:11-CV-405, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18820, 
at *11 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 15, 2012).  
3 McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 298-99. 
4 Id. at 294. 
5 McGlone II, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18820, at *3.  
6 McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 295.  Between 2008 and 2010, McGlone visited the 
University of Tennessee’s campus a total of five times.  Id.  Apart from his first visit, 
McGlone always notified the University of his intention to speak on campus 
beforehand.  Id.  He never encountered any difficulties with the University during his 
prior visits.  Id.   
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response, the University’s Dean of Student Affairs7 (Dean of Student 
Affairs) and the Associate Dean of Students8 (Associate Dean) 
informed McGlone that he must acquire a University sponsor before 
utilizing any open area of the campus.9  The Associate Dean further 
explained that sponsorship must be provided “by a registered student 
organization, staff, or faculty.”10   
 Conversely, in a separate communication, the University’s 
legal counsel informed McGlone that those who were not affiliated 
with the school must receive sponsorship from “students, faculty, or 
staff.”11  The University’s legal counsel further provided to McGlone 
the University’s two written policies: (1) the “Access to University 
Property” policy12 and (2) the University student handbook.13  The 
“Access to University Property” policy read as follows: “The 
University’s campuses and facilities shall be restricted to students, 
faculty, staff, guests, and invitees except on such occasions when all or 
part of the campuses, buildings, stadia, and other facilities are open to 
the general public.”14  Additionally, the student handbook defined 
“guest” as “[a] person invited by a university student or employee to 
visit the campus at a specific time, place, and occasion.”15 
 Conversely, the student handbook specifically addressed the 
University’s sponsorship requirement, which required persons 
unaffiliated with the University to obtain sponsorship in order to speak 
on campus.16  In a section entitled “Freedom of Expression and 
Speech,” the student handbook read as follows:  
 
[R]egistered student organizations on campus 
may freely select, without prior restraints, 
persons they wish to invite as guest speakers.  
                                                 
 
7 The Dean of Student Affairs is responsible for the interpretation and administration 
of University “regulations that pertain to expressive activities” on campus.  McGlone 
II, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18820, at *4. 
8 The Associate Dean is responsible for the administration of University regulations 
that pertain to campus activities.  Id.   
9 McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 295.   
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 The “Access to University Property” policy, or policy # 1720-1-2, was 
promulgated by the University Board of Trustees in 1970 under the provisions of the 
Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-101.  
Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. (emphasis added).   
16 Id. 
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There are no restrictions to control the point of 
view expressed by speakers other than those 
imposed by local, state, and federal laws.  Any 
person sponsored by a registered campus 
organization is free to speak . . . . The criterion 
for a negative decision will be a demonstrable 
inability to make such physical arrangements.17 
 
 McGlone was led to understand that in order to comply with 
the University’s sponsorship requirement, he needed to obtain 
sponsorship from a registered student organization or a University 
employee.18  McGlone failed in his attempts to ascertain proper 
sponsorship from numerous Christian-based student organizations, the 
Dean of Student Affairs, and the Associate Dean.19  Feeling “deterred 
by the process,” and fearful of arrest, McGlone did not return to the 
campus again.20   
 In 2011, McGlone filed a lawsuit claiming that the University’s 
sponsorship requirement was unconstitutionally vague, and thus 
violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech and 
due process.21  The lawsuit named individually, and in their official 
capacities, the Dean of Student Affairs, the Associate Dean, and the 
University Chancellor.22   
 Specifically, McGlone alleged that the University’s vague 
sponsorship requirement restrained and chilled his First Amendment 
right to religious speech.23  McGlone further alleged that the lack of 
objective guidelines or standards to guide the discretion of officials 
who were charged with enforcing the policy violated his Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process.24  Defendants, on the other hand, 
contended that the University’s sponsorship requirement was clearly 
established under the official “Access to University Property” policy, 
allowing any student, faculty, or staff to have the authority to grant 
sponsorship to visiting speakers.25   
                                                 
 
17 McGlone v. Cheek (McGlone II), No. 3:11-CV-405, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18820, at *6-7 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 15, 2012) (emphasis added). 
18 McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 296. 
19 Id. at 295-96. 
20 Id. at 296; McGlone II, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18820, at *10.  
21 McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 296. 
22 McGlone II, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18820, at *11. 
23 Id. at *12. 
24 Id. at *13. 
25 McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 296. 
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 McGlone moved for preliminary injunctive relief, hoping to 
enjoin all appropriate University affiliates from further enforcing the 
sponsorship requirement.26  Defendants moved to dismiss all claims.27   
 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Tennessee held that the University’s sponsorship requirement was not 
vague, but rather “well delineated,” and did not give University 
officials unbridled discretion to restrict speech.28  The district court 
denied McGlone’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief and granted 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss.29 
 
III. RATIONALE 
 
 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed.30  The Sixth Circuit 
examined the issue of whether the inconsistency between the two 
written University policies created a vagueness problem.31  The 
vagueness doctrine has two goals: (1) to ensure a policy’s fair notice to 
a man of ordinary intelligence and (2) to provide a policy’s explicit 
standards for enforcement by officials.32   
 Indeed, inconsistency existed between the University’s two 
written policies when one policy required, at a minimum, that a guest 
acquire sponsorship from a registered student organization, while the 
other only required sponsorship from an individual student or 
University employee.33  Here, McGlone believed he had to acquire 
sponsorship from a registered student organization in order to comply 
with the University’s sponsorship requirement.34  At the time, the 
University had 395 registered student organizations.35  Had McGlone 
acted under the provisions of the student handbook, he could have 
requested sponsorship from any of the more than 27,000 enrolled 
students or more than 8,000 University employees.36  Thus, although 
                                                 
 
26 McGlone II, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18820, at *13. 
27 Id. at *14.  
28 Id. at *31, *42.  
29 McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 296. 
30 Id. at 294. 
31 Id. at 297.  The inconsistency issue was only first presented during the appellate 
oral arguments.  Id. at 296.  Because the Sixth Circuit found the potential injustice to 
free speech to be adequately exceptional, it found sua sponte review of the issue to 
be appropriate.  Id. at 297. 
32 Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 
2007).  
33 See McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 295. 
34 Id. at 296. 
35 Id. at 298. 
36 Id. at 294-95. 
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the written policies for the sponsorship requirement varied little in 
wording, the implications were far more substantial.   
 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the lower court erred in 
finding that the University’s sponsorship requirement was well 
delineated.37  The Sixth Circuit held that the sponsorship requirement 
was unconstitutionally vague and unclear, quickly noting that the mere 
fact that the Dean of Student Affairs, the Associate Dean, and the 
University’s legal counsel all gave McGlone conflicting information 
was sufficient proof of the policy’s failure to ensure the first goal of 
the vagueness doctrine: fair notice to people of ordinary intelligence.38  
Furthermore, McGlone’s experiences with the University prior to 
August 25, 2010—successfully speaking on campus without 
University interference—also exemplified the University’s 
inconsistent enforcement of the sponsorship requirement.39   
The Sixth Circuit further held that the ambiguous language of 
the inconsistent policies invited a practice of discriminatory 
enforcement of the sponsorship requirement.40  Defendants contended 
at trial that the “Access to University Property” policy was the official 
guest speaker policy for the University.41  The “Access to University 
Property” policy, however, was silent as to who had the authoritative 
discretion for the delegation of the sponsorship requirement.42  On the 
other hand, the student handbook made clear that a guest speaker 
would be denied only if there was an inability to make appropriate 
physical arrangements.43   
Although the University contended that it held no power to 
revoke a guest’s sponsorship once successfully acquired, it did not 
deny that only a University-affiliated individual held the initial power 
to invoke sponsorship upon chosen guests.44  The mere possibility of a 
University official taking advantage of inconsistencies in policies to 
foreclose the option of sponsorship for undesirable individuals was 
sufficient for the Sixth Circuit to make a finding of plausible 
vagueness.45  The Sixth Circuit further found the University’s 
                                                 
 
37 Id. at 294. 
38 Id. at 298. 
39 Id. at 295. 
40 Id. at 298. 
41 Id. at 296. 
42 Id. at 298. 
43 See McGlone v. Cheek (McGlone II), No. 3:11-CV-405, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18820, at *6-7 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 15, 2012) (discussing the student handbook’s 
Freedom-of-Expression policy, which delineates that denial of sponsorship may only 
be based on the inability to provide adequate physical arrangements).   
44 McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 298. 
45 Id. 
208   Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice     [Vol. 3:2 
 
sponsorship requirement vulnerable to arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement due to inconsistency and ambiguity of the policies, failing 
the second goal of the vagueness doctrine.46   
Lastly, the Sixth Circuit feared that the inconsistency in the 
University’s policies ultimately threatened to chill an individual’s First 
Amendment right to free speech.47   
Here, McGlone attempted to defend specifically his First 
Amendment right to religious speech.48  Endeavoring to narrow the 
legal issue of this case to only that of free religious speech, however, 
would leave the analysis incomplete.  Although McGlone’s 
constitutional rights of free speech and due process were at stake, the 
main legal issue focused on the vagueness of the University’s written 
policies regarding the sponsorship requirement.49   
 It is important to note that the Sixth Circuit did not challenge, 
or even address, the lower court’s finding that the open areas of the 
University’s campus were limited public fora.50  “In a limited public 
forum, the government need not allow persons to engage in every type 
of speech, and may exclude a speaker who is not a member of the class 
for whose special benefit the forum was created.”51  The single 
objection the Sixth Circuit made over the University’s sponsorship 
requirement was the lack of consistency between the two written 
policies.52  As such, both the lower court and the Sixth Circuit did not 
deny the University’s capacity to preclude sponsorship from certain 
types of guest speakers, as long as the policies were rewritten in a 
                                                 
 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 299. 
48 Id. at 294. 
49 Id. at 297. 
50 See McGlone v. Cheek (McGlone II), No. 3:11-CV-405, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18820, at *25 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 15, 2012).  During its analysis, the district court 
noted a limited public forum is government-owned property that is “limited to use by 
certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects,” usually 
under some type of sponsorship requirement.  Id. at *19-20 (quoting Miller v. City of 
Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524, 534-35 (6th Cir. 2010)).  The three other types of fora are: 
(a) traditional public forum, (b) designated public forum, and (c) nonpublic forum.  
McGlone II, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18820, at *18.  A traditional public forum is a 
public area, such as a street, sidewalk, or park, which the government devotes to 
open assembly and debate.  Id. at *18-19.  A designated public forum is public 
property that is traditionally not a place for public debate or assembly, but the 
government allows it to be treated as a traditional public forum.  Id. at *19.  A 
nonpublic forum is a publicly-owned property that is not designated as a forum for 
public communication.  Id. at *21. 
51 Id. at *20 (citing Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001); 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).   
52 McGlone I, 534 F. App’x at 297-98. 
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more concise, coherent manner and did not discriminate based on 
viewpoint.53  In essence, both of the University’s written policies were 
facially constitutional when considered separately.   
 Overall, the ramifications of McGlone are slight.  The 
University will likely review and rewrite its written policies regarding 
sponsorship requirement in a more consistent manner, as well as any 
other applicable policies that might include any other inconsistencies.  
Other private and public institutions should take note of this case 
because of its implications.  Indeed, the same plaintiff, McGlone, filed 
a nearly identical lawsuit against Tennessee Technological University 
(“TTU”) in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Tennessee a year before the instant case, indicating the prevalence of 
such claims.54  That case also made it to the Sixth Circuit, where a 
similar result ensued.55   
Although painstaking, institutions must take meticulous 
measures to promote consistent and straightforward written policies.  
Institutions should not regard this as a radical alteration but rather an 
overdue requisite.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 In conclusion, the outcome of McGlone, while not 
revolutionary, reemphasized the fundamental understanding that a 
policy, rule, statute, or law, which intends to enforce any requirement 
upon an individual, must be sufficiently consistent and plainly 
coherent in its language so that an ordinary person of common 
intelligence will be able to easily understand it and protect his or her 
own constitutional rights.   
                                                 
 
53 See id. at 299; McGlone II, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18820, at *23-24. 
54 See McGlone v. Bell (McGlone III), 681 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2012).  See generally 
Gilles v. Garland, 281 F. App'x 501 (6th Cir. 2008) (dismissing plaintiff’s free 
speech and due process claims against Miami University and its unwritten 
sponsorship requirement policy); Gilles v. Miller, 501 F. Supp. 2d 939 (W.D. Ky. 
2007) (denying a motion for preliminary injunctive relief brought by the same 
plaintiff from Gilles v. Garland regarding a similar sponsorship requirement policy 
at Murray State University).  
55 McGlone III, 681 F.3d at 722.   
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